








hope it will be understood from the beginning
that I am not one of those Americans who
think that the Celestial Economist smiles with spe-
cial favor on the U.S.A., or that American busi-
nessmen are more entrepreneurial, American
workers more ingenious, and American policies
more appropriate than their European counter-
parts. Not at all. Nevertheless, the remarks which
follow are implicitly critical of European thinking
about macroeconomics, and also about the policies
that follow from that thinking. I ask you, please to
keep it in mind that I am really trying to make a
few general remarks about macroeconomic princi-
ples and macroeconomic policies.
The basic facts we have to understand are easy to
describe and well known to most of us. In 1970 the
unemployment rate in the U.S. was 5%, that in
(West) Germany was 1%, and in the rest of the
European Union the unemployment rate stood at
3%. In those days, American economists, myself
included, used to wonder what the U.S. would have
to do in order to reproduce the European experi-
ence. In 1997 the unemployment rate was still 5%
in the U.S. (4.9% to be exact) and in 1998 it was a
full half-point lower. Meanwhile the (Unified)
German unemployment rate was at 10% and the
rest of the European Union was between 11 and
12%.
The contrast is certainly striking. Europe used to
have consistently lower unemployment than the
U.S.; now it has higher. Since 1970, there has been
no trend in U.S. unemployment; it is actually a bit
lower than it was then. But there have been
marked business-cycle fluctuations, with the
unemployment rate peaking in 1975, 1982 and
1992, and reaching low points before and after the
peaks. Today we have the lowest unemployment
rate in 30 years. When you look at the European
experience, the clear impression is that there has
been a strong upward trend that dominates the
business cycle.
That contrast poses an inevitable question: What
explains the difference between the current levels
of unemployment in Europe and the U.S.? There is
a tendency in matters like this to assume that there
must be one single answer to this question, one
secret ingredient that explains why the U.S. has
kept its unemployment rate moderately low while
Europe has seen its rate rise to high levels and get
stuck there. That would make for drama; but eco-
nomic life is not necessarily like a detective story.
It is more likely that the difference between
American and European unemployment arises
from the cumulation of several differences in insti-
tutions and policies.
Furthermore, the talk of “Europe” is not always
appropriate. There are big differences within
Europe; for instance, Austria, Norway and, more
recently, the Netherlands and Denmark have
avoided the high unemployment that has contin-
ued to characterise France and Germany.The most
I can hope to do is to pick out a few useful lessons
that bear on the main issue.
The conventional understanding of this contrast,
especially among Europeans, seems to rest entirely
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the title of a recent and exhaustive article by Horst
Siebert,“Labour Market Rigidities:At the Root of
Unemployment in Europe”. Beyond doubt there
are plenty of labour-market rigidities to rest an
argument on. The main ones to attract attention
seem to have been: (a) the relatively low replace-
ment rate embodied in the U.S. unemployment
insurance system compared with most European
countries, as well as the relatively short duration of
benefits allowed in the U.S., the natural conse-
quence being more active search by unemployed
workers and more willing acceptance of inferior job
offers; (b) the broad scope of legal restrictions on
discharging workers in Europe which, though per-
haps working against unemployment in the short
run, has the long-run effect of discouraging job cre-
ation and strengthening the power of incumbent
workers to protect wages at the expense of out-
siders seeking employment; (c) the relatively low
minimum wage in the U.S., which allows higher
employment of low-productivity workers at the
expense of greater wage inequality; (d) Siebert
points out that the U.S. labour market generally
allows greater wage differentiation between classes
of workers than in Europe, but I think this may be
a more complicated matter than just a difference in
labour-market institutions; (e) the greater density
and power of trade unions in Europe; (f) the wider
wedge of payroll taxes and social charges in Europe
that surely pushes some low-wage workers below
the margin of employability; even if the long-run
incidence of such charges is generally on workers’
wages, this tax-shifting may not be possible at or
near the minimum wage.
That is an impressive array of labour-market rigidi-
ties. So perhaps it is understandable that this is the
only explanation of high unemployment that is
ever discussed seriously by civil servants and cen-
tral bankers in much of Europe, especially Ger-
many. Consequently the only potential cure for
high and persistent unemployment that is ever
seriously discussed is labour-market reform and
wage moderation, though that process is inevitably
slow and sure to be socially divisive.
I do not think one can deny the significance of labour-
market rigidities in Europe, and the likelihood that
greater flexibility in the U.S. contributes to its much
more favourable performance in terms of employ-
ment.But I believe that the almost exclusive focus on
this aspect of the problem is a major mistake. It hides
other, very important, lines of causality, and steers
Europe away from possible policy strategies that
could have substantial results in much less time, and
with a fairer distribution of the burden.
There are good empirical reasons for rejecting this
convenient belief that the labour market by itself
provides an adequate account of the sad story of
European unemployment.At the crudest level, the
timing is wrong. One of the two big increases in
unemployment took place in the early 1980s,
although there was no change in labour-market
regulation to account for it.
The argument was sometimes made that European
wage determination (unlike the U.S.) exhibited
“real-wage resistance” or effective indexing of the
nominal wage. This stickiness of the real wage
could certainly be a source of unemployment in
principle and in fact.But real-wage resistance must
eventually have worn off.The profit share has risen
to very high levels in Europe, meaning that real
wages have not kept pace with productivity. But
unemployment did not wither away, so this story is
inadequate.And the further rise in unemployment
after 1990 came during a period when labour mar-
kets were being deregulated in the major nations
of Europe. Some other forces must have been at
work.
The second empirical reason for rejecting an exclu-
sive focus on the labour market is less obvious and
more indirect.A useful summary indicator of many
kinds of labour-market rigidity is the position of
the so-called Beveridge curve, named after Sir
William Beveridge’s famous wartime report Full
Employment in a Free Society. Beveridge chose to
define “full employment” as a situation in which
there are as many unfilled jobs as there are unem-
ployed workers. The definition was not generally
acceptable, but it suggested studying the relation
between the number of unemployed workers and
the number of unfilled jobs, both expressed as a
fraction of the labour force.
In any country at any moment,the Beveridge curve
is a downward-sloping relation between the vacan-
cy rate and the unemployment rate. It has a nega-
tive slope for the common-sense reason that jobs
are easier to fill, and the vacancy rate therefore is
lower, the more unemployed workers there are for
employers to choose among.A perfectly flexible or
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cle to the frictionless matching of an unfilled job
and an unemployed worker with the appropriate
skills. Flexible wages would adjust so that every
part of the labour market had, within reason, ade-
quate employment opportunities. In that case,
vacant jobs and unemployed workers could not
coexist. The Beveridge curve would coincide with
the axes of the diagram: there could be vacancies
with no unemployment or there could be unem-
ployment with no vacancies. One would expect
pressure on wages in either case.
Of course no real-world labour market could be
perfectly flexible in that sense. Labour-market
rigidities (including skill mismatches as a special
form of rigidity) are precisely what allows vacan-
cies and unemployment to coexist, and the more
rigidities there are, the more the Beveridge curve
diverges from the hypothetical limiting case, the
further from the zero-zero point it is located.In the
U.S., for instance, there appears to be a well-
defined Beveridge curve for 1958–71 that shifted
adversely in the early 1970s and then returned to
its initial position in 1987–88, and has stayed there
since.
It is more interesting and relevant to look at
France and Germany, where the story is quite dif-
ferent. The main message transmitted by the
Beveridge curves for France and Germany goes
squarely against the cliché that high and persistent
unemployment is entirely or mainly a matter of
worsening functioning of the labour market. It is
precisely in France and Germany that there is no
sign of a major unfavourable shift of the Beveridge
curve during the period of rising unemployment.
To the extent that the location of the Beveridge
curve is a reasonable summary of the degree of
labour-market rigidity, the large continental
economies do not seem to have suffered from
noticeably more rigid labour markets during the
high-unemployment 1980s than they did in the
low-unemployment 1970s. In fact, what stands out
from the data for France and Germany is precisely
the depressed level of the vacancy variable,i.e.,the
weakness of the demand for labour.
Careful studies in the U.S. have demonstrated the
importance of analysing net changes in employ-
ment and unemployment as the resultant of gross
flows of job creation and job destruction.As I hint-
ed earlier, much of the European failure to reduce
unemployment arises from low exit rates from
unemployment during limited business-cycle
upswings. This in turn suggests that an important
part of the problem is an inadequate rate of job
creation. Here may be the source of the shocking
difference between Europe and the U.S.in the inci-
dence of long-term unemployment. In the U.S. in
1997, 8.7% of all the unemployed had been out of
work for more than 12 months.The corresponding
figure for Germany (1996) was 47.8%, for France
41.2%, for the U.K. 38.6%, and for the E.U. as a
whole 50.2%.This contrast would still be apparent
if we used U.S.figures for periods of relatively high
unemployment.It is even possible that the tolerant
character of the European unemployment insur-
ance system is as much a response to as it is a cause
of the low exit probability from unemployment.
A weakness in job creation could have several
sources; one of them might be those legal restric-
tions on firing workers. But I suggest that product-
market deregulation (of opening hours, land use,
banking practices) and increased competition
might help to reduce unemployment by improving
employment prospects. Finally, I suggest that
American fiscal and monetary policy has been
more successful than Europe has been in support-
ing aggregate demand, and above all more aggres-
sive in taking advantage of opportunities to
expand whenever inflationary pressure has been
weak, whatever the cause of that weakness. This
could be important for two reasons. The first rea-
son is the direct effect of excessively tight fiscal
and monetary policy on an economy with limited
wage and price flexibility. The second reason why
demand-side policy could be very important has to
do with its interaction with the supply side. Any
gain in labour-market flexibility or in product-mar-
ket deregulation will be both more effective and
more easily accepted if it occurs at a time when
aggregate demand is strong and market prospects
are favourable. There is likely to be considerable
payoff to coordination of supply-side and demand-
side policies within the large European countries
and among members of the European Union.
More flexibility in labour markets is a good idea,
but it is not the only good idea.